Aaron Gordon
Orlando Magic Playbook: How the Orlando Magic finish games
Aaron Gordon

Orlando Magic Playbook: How the Orlando Magic finish games

Updated Mar. 4, 2020 10:37 p.m. ET

Dec 10, 2016; Orlando, FL, USA; Orlando Magic guard Evan Fournier (10) dunks the ball during the second half of an NBA basketball game against the Denver Nuggets at Amway Center. The Nuggets won 121-113. Mandatory Credit: Reinhold Matay-USA TODAY Sports

The Orlando Magic ran some beautiful, and simple, sets to force overtime and double overtime in their win. It revealed some clues on how they finish games.

When the Orlando Magic hired Frank Vogel, they figured they were getting a team with a strong defensive background, but questionable offensive acumen.

In his time with the Indiana Pacers, the team was a top-10 defense every year. But his offenses often floundered. There was that one year they were in the top-five (the first year they reached the conference finals) but largely the team was below average offensively. And with this Magic team, it figured the team’s offense would have some struggles.

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Without a go-to player or a ton of shooting, the Magic’s success would come down to their ability to execute a game plan. To run through plays effectively to create open shots.

And nowhere is a coach’s value and ability to get shots put more under the microscope than late in games.

No, clutch situations are not the be-all, end-all for a coach. It is a 48-minute game and one two-minute stretch or possession is not enough to pillory any player.

But these plays do matter. This is a results-based business. When it is a two-point game late and the team needs a basket coming out of a timeout, the pressure ramps up. And success or failure can come down to a single play or shot.

The Magic have played plenty of close games this year. According to NBA.com, the Magic have played in 18 games within five points in the final five minutes, sixth most in the league. As statistics would probably project, the Magic are 9-9 in such games. Close games, essentially, are 50-50 shots and the Magic are average.

In fact, Orlando is league average late in games. The team posts a 105.8 offensive rating late in games. The Magic’s offense rises to the occasion (it is the defense that struggles with a 108.6 defensive rating). This is in 68 minutes, so it is a relatively small sample size. And success is obviously matchup dependent.

Considering Vogel’s less-than-sterling reputation as an offensive coach and the Magic’s general struggles offensively, it is interesting to see how this team operates in close game situations.

Like many teams, they have had their ups and downs.

But now that Orlando has some confidence offensively, the team is executing some brilliant sets late in games. That was especially true in Tuesday’s 136-130 win over the Miami Heat. There, Vogel made some key play calls and the Magic executed them well, showing just what Orlando can do offensively.

Ingenuity in the post

At the end of the fourth quarter Tuesday, the Orlando Magic trailed by two points with about 10 seconds. They called a timeout following a free throw and prepared to set up a play. Jeff Green is the inbounder and gets his first option to inbound.

What is unique about this is the Magic inbound the ball directly to the post. This is not something many teams do. Orlando has that luxury though because Nikola Vucevic can be a fulcrum to run an offense. He comes to the ball and flashes to the block, getting pushed out to the mid post.

Vucevic is a dangerous weapon here. He was having a strong offensive game and could easily score with nine seconds to play.

But what makes Vucevic more threatening is his ability to pass the ball. He is averaging 2.5 assists per game, 10th among NBA post players. Vucevic is a good passer and can read a defense well while he is attacking the basket. And he has the time here to do so to let the play develop.

The first read is for Vucevic to pause and let the play develop. The inbounder is often one of the most dangerous players so he makes a hard cut across the paint. But he is not cutting to score. The Magic want to get a look to their top offensive option.

Jeff Green gets a screen from Evan Fournier that could allow him to curl to the basket. Tyler Johnson does a good job hedging the screen to protect the basket. But Evan Fournier does a good job screening Josh Richardson and he fails to switch the screen — usually teams will switch all screens in these late-game situations.

Fournier is the decoy. With the screen made, he cuts to the ball, curling around Vucevic to the short corner. Vucevic then asks as a flare screen to free up Fournier for a wide-open jumper. It was a perfectly executed play.

Except for Fournier missing the shot.

Serge Ibaka gutted out the offensive rebound and somehow flipped the shot in to force overtime.

This play was not a failure, though. It was a great and unique use of two of the Magic’s best offensive options.

And even having Vucevic involved this way may have freed up Ibaka. Hassan Whiteside steps out to challenge Fournier’s shot, forcing two Heat guards to crash down on Vucevic to prevent him from getting the offensive board. That freed up a small pocket for Serge Ibaka to grab the rebound.

This bit of misdirection had several options for the Magic to succeed and get a bucket. If Fournier cannot get open or the Heat switch that play, then Vucevic can go to work in the post. Or reset for a side pick and roll with Fournier.

What is important in late-game situations is to have multiple options and variations. Something that occurred again in overtime.

Options and variations

Here is another play where the first option works.

The Magic again are down two points and trying to get Fournier the ball. That is a good thing, right? Fournier is the Magic’s best creator. And with plenty of time, they can run the clock down or run a pick and roll to get him a good shot (more on that later, because Green makes the right play here).

Green runs off the Nikola Vucevic screen to pop open at the elbow to get the inbounds. This is what you want in an inbounds play, a player coming to the ball and presenting himself open and big. Fournier has a good target and inbounds the ball. If Green did not pop open at the elbow, D.J. Augustin was coming free to the top of the key. From there, Fournier likely makes the same move and cuts toward D.J. Augustin to receive the ball.

Once Fournier inbounds the ball, he immediately moves toward Green for a dribble hand off. This is a quasi-pick and roll, but is really used to create space for Fournier to receive the ball, pause and reset the play. Green can cut to the right corner to spread the floor. Augustin could creep over to the far left wing and Serge Ibaka in the corner to bring Nikola Vucevic up for a pick and roll.

The Magic, after all, are down two with the shot clock off. Reason would dictate a team run the clock out here for the last shot.

That is not what happens here. Green makes a really heady read (one that Aaron Gordon probably does not make yet — being a veteran has its value).

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As Fournier comes across to receive the handoff, Green notices two things. One, Josh Richardson is doing a good job chasing Fournier, making the handoff tougher than normal. This is the kind of moment where a play for the Magic blows up and now the Magic are rushing to get back into their play (keep reading…).

The other thing he notices is Tyler Johnson is hedging a bit too much toward Fournier. He certainly is not expecting Green to make a sudden attack at the basket. As the handoff fails, Green turns and sees the lane.

The turn and drive to the basket are very quick. It catches Johnson off guard and he has to scramble to return, committing the foul. Green hits both free throws and the Magic force a second overtime.

This is a play that really only has one or two options. But the Magic are able to make the read to determine which way to go with it and how to play. Green makes his move quickly here. He does not wait or try to force the ball back to Fournier. When it is clear he will not make the pass to Fournier, he turns and attacks.

That is the play. And he executed it seamlessly, reading the option and making the play.

Late-game plays are all about execution. Can you run the play, make the right read and run through the progression and options to create a good shot.

The Magic know all too well how that can go wrong when a player is not decisive late in the game.

Decisiveness

The Orlando Magic’s crushing loss to the Memphis Grizzlies, and the final play that sealed their fate, was a lesson in indecisiveness. That is something no team can have late in a game.

On the final play, the Magic run a clean inbound and get Elfrid Payton at the top of the key. Always a good start for the Magic considering his playmaking and driving ability. He should be able to create something with the team down one and 12 seconds to play. Plenty of time.

What happens next is a series of overpassing and missteps that end ultimately in a turnover. The team did not even get a shot up.

Unlike the plays the Magic ran in Miami a month later, the inbounder here is not a weapon. Green simply steps back onto the court. But like those other plays, Fournier is the primary option. He runs off a few cross screens and curls up to the wing to receive the ball.

The Grizzlies are back defending the paint. Tony Allen gets caught on the Vucevic screen, Marc Gasol is playing safety and Andrew Harrison shifts over to defend Fournier immediately, leaving his man Payton beyond the arc (not a terrible risk).

Fournier notes the switch and the space created with Harrison leaving Payton open, but this plays into the Grizzlies’ hands. He drives hard to the left, his head down and the Grizzlies collapse.

But Fournier has options. Ibaka has popped to the short corner or he could kick it back out to Green, who has not moved since stepping back onto the court after the inbounds. And, if Fournier really trusts and knows the play, Vucevic is wide open beyond the 3-point line.

Fournier drives too deep and begins to regret this decision. He drives into Gasol to create some space and dishes to Ibaka in the short corner.

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    Perhaps if Ibaka is in the deep corner for a 3, he has the space to get a shot off. Instead, the Grizzlies swarm him and he passes it quickly to Elfrid Payton. Even with the fast pass, the Grizzlies defense has reset and the Magic are now in scramble mode.

    Payton tries to drive and draw Allen in or to create something with time winding down. And he does draw Allen in. That leaves Vucevic wide open for 3 to his right. Instead, Payton tries to force a pass to Fournier and Fournier is not ready to receive the pass.

    This play was not executed poorly per se. The Magic got through a lot of their reads. The problem with this play was how players kept their heads down and did not make the plays to keep the ball moving.

    When Vogel talks about “trusting the pass,” this is more what he refers to. The team has to be willing to make the pass and keep their head up even when they attack.

    One thing this Magic team cannot afford to do is go to isolation. That is when they create their worst offense.

    Forcing Fournier

    Neither of these plays on this slide is particularly bad as far as isolations. But they show the importance of execution.

    Payton needs a quick score here and makes a good read after Evan Fournier is unable to free himself on the pin down. Fournier’s cut has cleared the space, though, and Payton drives into it to get a pretty good layup look. He misses.

    The only problem with this play is, like the Grizzlies play, once the Magic make that initial drive there is no reaction or secondary play to give Payton an outlet. He is either going to shoot the layup or the entire play breaks down.

    This is more evident in the below play from the loss to the Washington Wizards:

    Here Payton makes a nice drive and because of some good off-ball action with Nikola Vucevic setting a back screen for Payton to cut into the lane, Marcin Gortat sinks into the paint and Payton feeds an open Vucevic.

    Vucevic has a bit of a window to attack here. But not a big one. Payton is running toward him, bringing a second defender into the paint and Green is crowding Vucevic some on the left wing instead of cutting to the top of the key or away from the play. So Otto Porter has one eye on the ball too.

    Vucevic does not think about driving, though. He is going to do a dribble handoff to Fournier. The Magic are forcing this play to him.

    Fournier runs pass Vucevic without receiving the pass and immediately cuts back. Unlike Green in the Miami play, Vucevic does not think to attack. He continues to wait for Fournier to double back.

    This allows Gortat to anticipate the play and smother Fournier as he comes around force him into a difficult 3-pointer that he air balls.

    Dec 16, 2016; Orlando, FL, USA; Orlando Magic guard Evan Fournier (10) celebrates after making a shot against the Brooklyn Nets during the second half at Amway Center. Orlando Magic defeated the Brooklyn Nets 118-111. Mandatory Credit: Kim Klement-USA TODAY Sports

    Late games are Fournier’s time

    What should be clear from this analysis is the Magic like to go to Evan Fournier often late in games.

    This season, Fournier leads the team with 2.6 points per game in clutch situations (defined as any game within five points in the final five minutes). He shoots a 58.9 percent effective field goal percentage. He is fairly efficient and effective late in games.

    The Magic are right to turn to him because of how he can shoot and create.

    But what is more important in these situations is the Magic run an actual offensive set. They have to make sure they do not force the ball to their primary offensive option or leave Fournier one on one. That is not how he will succeed.

    The Magic’s offensive sets are better when they create multiple options and trust their players to make the right reads. It is also important, as it is throughout the game, to have multiple actions and options going on. The Magic need outlets and safety valves offensively when things break down.

    Vogel has shown an aptitude drawing up plays that will create good opportunities late in games so far this season. The Magic have experienced at least moderate success winning close games. Their late-game execution and play design certainly has helped.

    Like with everything with this team, it is about consistency in execution. Orlando seems to be in the right spots late in games. When they make the right reads and play aggressively and together, their offense can do some very pretty things.

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