How General Manager Jerry Reese Fixed the New York Giants
New York Giants general manager Jerry Reese quietly made some changes to roster building that have paid off handsomely for the team in 2016.
About a year ago, there was little doubt about what New York Giants team owner John Mara was feeling after having witnessed his franchise flounder for a fourth straight year without a playoff berth, and a third straight year without a wining record.
“Jerry knows this is on him,” Mara said of his team’s general manager, Jerry Reese. “I’ve had that discussion. You can’t hide from the record. It’s up to you now to get it fixed because the last three years are just not acceptable.”
Despite his simmering anger, Mara, who said the Giants “need to make changes in personnel,” was intent on sticking with Reese. As it turns out, that was whole-heartedly the right decision.
A year later, Reese and the personnel department have indeed changed some of their ways. While not everything has gone exactly accounting to plan—more on that in the postscript—here’s a look at some areas where Reese altered the organization’s approach, and how those changes have helped get the Giants back on track.
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Better Drafts
Free agency might provide instant gratification, but the draft remains the backbone of a franchise. Unfortunately, the Giants draft history from 2010-13 was built on sand instead of concrete. From those classes, only two first-round picks, defensive end Jason Pierre-Paul (2010) and offensive lineman Justin Pugh (2013), developed into starters.
In addition to Pugh and Pierre-Paul, two other players from those classes, defensive tackle Johnathan Hankins and quarterback Ryan Nassib (now on IR), made the roster, with Hankins becoming a starter and Nassib firmly entrenched as a backup.
What Went Wrong
The biggest flaw in the Giants’ approach toward the draft appears to be overestimating the talent on past rosters. For instance, the Giants waited nearly two years after their 2011 Super Bowl victory to begin rebuilding their offensive line. They instead tried to squeeze every last drop out of guys like David Baas, David Diehl and Chris Snee.
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This approach appeared to lead the Giants brass to being a little more willing to taking some risks not just on the offensive line, but across the board that ultimately didn’t work out. Some of those risks included offensive linemen James Brewer (fourth round) and Brandon Mosley (fourth round), defensive end Damontre Moore (third round), defensive tackle Marvin Austin (second round), and tight end Adrien Robinson (fourth round).
With each draft pick that failed to materialize, the Giants were left with little choice but to fill the hole via free agency.
What They Changed
In the last couple of years, the Giants have minimized taking high-risk/high-reward gambles, including risks on injured players and those from smaller programs like receiver Ramses Barden (third round, 2009). Instead, they have gone for “safer” picks—players who were relatively injury-free coming out of college and had been productive throughout their careers at a level that was arguably loser to being NFL ready.
There was also a shift toward taking team captains to boost the leadership base that had significantly deteriorated over the years.
The results have spoken for themselves. Guys like Odell Beckham Jr., Eli Apple, Sterling Shepard, Paul Perkins, Landon Collins, Weston Richburg, Ereck Flowers, Bobby Hart, Owa Odighizuwa, Paul Perkins, and Devon Kennard are all key cornerstones in the franchise’s foundation.
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Smarter Trades
At times, the general football fanbase seems to be infatuated with making trades to solve problems that exist on a team’s roster. Unfortunately, it’s not always that easy because trades usually involve draft picks, which any general manager won’t just give away unless the return on investment is promising over the long haul.
For example, there was a huge outcry by the fan base for the Giants to make a trade for Cleveland Browns offensive tackle Joe Thomas in season this year. While on the surface it’s easy to understand why people wanted a 10-time Pro Bowler and future Hall of Fame tackle, common sense has to kick in considering Thomas maybe has four more years left as an effective player where a premium draft pick that likely would have had to be given to the Browns for Thomas could give deliver double that amount of service.
Reese has proven that he’s not really a big-time dealer in both the draft and in-season. That’s not a bad thing, though it would be nice if he can build up the roster to actually stockpile picks in the coming years once he adds even more talent to the roster that will afford them to do so.
What Went Wrong
The two key criteria for making a successful trade in the NFL is to get someone who can help your team right away and for years to come. This wasn’t always the case under Reese. In 2009, they traded up six spots in the third round with a division rival (Eagles), giving up their third-round pick and one of their two fifth-round picks (164th overall) to get receiver Ramses Barden, a small-school receiver who never panned out,
In 2013, the Giants made a couple of other trades, one in the draft when they traded up six spots in that year’s draft, sending their fourth- and a sixth-round pick (No. 187 overall) for quarterback Ryan Nassib, a player whom Reese famously said he hoped “never played.”
Later that year, desperate for help at middle linebacker, Reese made a rare in-season trade with the Carolina Panthers, sending their 2014 seventh-round pick to get Jon Beason, a three-time Pro Bowler with durability issues.
While Beason managed to make it through the 2013 season and brought leadership to the locker room, his inability to stay on the field didn’t yield the long-term return on investment the Giants hoped for.
What They Changed
Reese became far more selective regarding trades. As a result, he has hit home runs with two recent examples. The first is punter Brad Wing, for whom Reese sent a conditional seventh-rounder to Pittsburgh at the end of the 2015 preseason. Wing didn’t earn a Pro Bowl berth this year, but he’s been gold for the Giants in terms of pinning the opponent deep their own territory.
Wing’s net average is currently third, behind Pro Bowler Johnny Hekker of the Rams. Wing has won back-to-back NFC Special Teams Player of the Week awards, and is a candidate for the NFC Special Teams Player of the Month Honors for December.
Perhaps the biggest home run in the trade department to date, though, is safety Landon Collins. The Giants moved up seven spots in the second round of the 2015 draft to get. New York sent the Tennessee Titans their 40th-overall pick, their fourth-round selection (No. 108) and their seventh-rounder (No. 245) to land the future Pro Bowl safety.
Want another reason to love these last two trades? Wing is only 25 years old and Collins just 22, which means both should be Giants for years to come.
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Wiser Use of the Salary Cap
The late George Young once said that the NFL salary cap was the first thing he used to think about when he woke up in the morning and the last thing he’d think about when he went to bed at night. That might sound like a cliché, but as NFL fans know, the salary cap drives what a team can do.
The key to successfully managing the cap is to choose wisely, and to know when to cut your losses of guys who are no longer living up to their contracts. Bill Belichick of the Patriots is a master at this, which is a big reason the Patriots, year after year, are able to do what they do.
The Giants? For all the kudos Reese is getting for having spent close to $200 million to rebuild the defense, no one is really talking about his big spending splurge of 2014 where he spent more than $115 million on roughly two dozen free agents, a splurge that failed to produce a winning season and which was also mostly flawed.
What Went Wrong
The golden rule of free agency is simple: Go for youth, go for durability and go for production. With very few exceptions—cornerback Dominique Rodgers-Cromartie and running back Rashad Jennings immediately come to mind—the Giants didn’t check all the boxes with their free agency splurge of 2014.
Offensive lineman Geoff Schwartz signed a four-year, $16.8 million contract in 2014. Prior to signing with the Giants, Schwartz, who was with three other teams (Carolina, Minnesota and Kansas City) had a solid season in 2013 with the Chiefs at right guard.
So what did the Giants do? They signed him to play left guard, a position he never really looked comfortable playing. To make matters worse, Schwartz played in just 13 games over two seasons for the Giants because of injuries before New York parted ways with him in early 2016.
A second example is Beason. As previously noted, Beason’s arrival the year before settled the defense down in 2013, the Giants rolled the dice and re-signed him to a three-year, $17 million contract with $6.03 million guaranteed. Beason’s injury history made him a huge risk. Unfortunately, that risk didn’t pan out, as he played in just nine games over two seasons after signing his contract.
What They Changed
The old saying that you get what you pay for really is true. If you’re going to spend big, you might as well do it on youth, durability, and a history of production. That’s exactly what Reese did when it came time to rebuild a broken defense, taking a less-is-more approach as far as quantity, but looking instead for a higher quality.
His $200 million spending spree landed him the best pass rusher (defensive end Olivier Vernon), the best run stopper (defensive tackle Damon Harrison), a solid cover linebacker (Keenan Robinson), and a shutdown cornerback (Janoris Jenkins).
Youth served? Check. The average age of those players at their time of signing is 26. Per Spotrac, the entire 2016 Giants roster’s average age is 26.46, which makes them the eighth youngest team in the league. In 2014, their average age was 26.28, which made them the third-oldest team in the NFL that season.
Durability? Double check. Vernon, Harrison and Robinson haven’t missed any games this season; Jenkins has missed one thus far (last week vs. Philadelphia), but should be back for the 2016 regular-season finale.
Production? Triple check. Prior to signing with the Giants, each of those players’ stocks had risen over their careers. Since signing, each has continued to play as though he were still in a contract season.
One final note worth mentioning is the effect on the salary cap when choosing players with a better durability history. In 2014, the Giants had $34.63 million in contracts sitting on injured reserve, or 26.2 percent of their cap for that season. This year they only have $12.472 million sitting on injured reserve, about seven percent of their 2016 cap allotment. This means the Giants are getting more bang for their buck this year than they did in 2014.
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Post Script
While Reese and the rest of the Giants front office definitely made progress in rebuilding a shattered franchise, there were some notable areas where they came up short. The first is obviously the mishandling of the Josh Brown situation. During his last meeting with the media back in October, Reese refused to shed any light on what role he had in re-signing Brown to a two-year, $4 million contract.
Absent those details, it’s hard to accurately critique him, other than to say that as part of the front office, he apparently had to be on the same page with everyone regarding signing off on the transaction.
The other area fans will point to—and with good reason—is the offensive line. While Reese and the Giants tried to add veteran depth at tackle, a position which remains paper-thin to date, he was unable to adequately do so. Why? The most likely reason was the team’s insistence of leaving Ereck Flowers, the ninth-overall draft pick in 2015, at left tackle.
For all the steps forward Reese took in restoring pride and respectability to the Giants, there is still much to be done in the coming offseason, but that’s a topic for another time.
