Delaying arrival of young baseball talent in majors is getting old
PEORIA, Ariz. — So I asked some smart baseball people on Monday how to adjust the collective bargaining agreement to end the silliness of teams holding down top prospects such as Cubs third baseman Kris Bryant for service-time considerations.
Officials from both the players union and Major League Baseball had virtually the same reply:
"If you figure it out, let us know."
I can't figure it out, and the players and owners couldn't figure it out after kicking around some ideas in their last round of labor negotiations.
During the next labor talks, there will be no excuse.
Everyone who loves the sport should be sick of the charade in which a hot prospect tears up spring training, then returns to the minors for at least two weeks to delay his free agency by one year.
A player receives a year of service for 172 days. A season normally consists of 183. So for the Cubs to get an extra year of control on Bryant, they likely will need to postpone his arrival for at least 12 days. If they want to prevent him from qualifying for an extra year of arbitration, they probably would need to hold off until June.
The Cubs won't dare wait that long on Bryant, who is 10 for 23 with a major-league-leading six homers this spring. But except in rare circumstances (Jason Heyward in 2010 and Jose Fernandez in 2013 were two recent examples), every team would gladly trade two weeks of a player's rookie season for an extra year of control in his prime.
The fact that Bryant is represented by Scott Boras gives the Cubs another reason to start the player in the minors. Everyone in the sport is aware that Boras rarely advises his clients to accept extensions, preferring them to determine their values on the open market.
The Cubs, of course, are wealthy enough to afford Bryant long term, but that is a separate issue from the CBA serving as a deterrent for teams that want to put out the best possible product. Baseball, under new Commissioner Rob Manfred, supposedly is eager to promote its young stars. OK, then fix the CBA, which expires after the 2016 season. And remove the incentive for teams to hide their top prospects, even if only for two weeks.
When the best players are not in the majors, it's bad for baseball. When service-time shenanigans become an annual topic of discussion, it's bad for baseball. When teams cannot be transparent with young players — and when those players come to spring training knowing they can be Babe Ruth and not make the Opening Day roster — it's bad for baseball.
So, how do you fix it?
Any system in which salary arbitration and free agency are tied to service time is subject to manipulation. I initially liked Mike Petriello's suggestion on Fangraphs to make 100 days of service a "qualifying season," an adjustment that likely would push the decision date to about June 20. While clubs wouldn't wait that long on top prospects such as Bryant, they still would pull the same types of moves with different, lesser players. Mission only partly accomplished.
The root of the problem is that teams know precisely how long to hold off promoting players. If they lose that knowledge, they would be less certain of their behavior, less likely to manipulate the system. The Super Two model actually could be instructive in this regard. Teams do not know until after the season the exact date when players qualified for an extra year of arbitration. Some manipulation still occurs, of course. But not as much.
So, let's explore some ideas, the bulk of which I derived from conversations with club executives and MLB and union officials:
• If a player makes an Opening Day roster, grant his team an extra year of control in exchange for his receiving an extra year of arbitration. The player would need to stay in the majors for the vast majority of his career, or the conditions would no longer apply.
This actually is my idea — and it's admittedly flawed. The owners likely would go apoplectic over granting a fifth year of arbitration, and the players might not want to give up the seventh year of control so easily.
• Tie a player's eligibility for arbitration and free agency to his age, not dates.
A player's age obviously cannot be manipulated, and eligibility for the Rule 5 draft already works in this fashion. Players who were signed when they were 19 or older and have played pro ball for four years are eligible, as are players who were signed at 18 and have played for five years.
The problem with implementing the concept for free agency is that it would penalize the Mike Trouts of the world, players who reach the majors at a young age and gain an advantage in the marketplace.
• Introduce randomness so that a team would not know at which point it gains an extra year of control over a player.
Every year in October, the union and MLB could stage a drawing with five dates from the previous season — say, April 15, May 1, May 15, June 1 and June 15.
Over time, the dates likely would average out so that neither side draws a particular benefit. Teams such as the Cubs might be discouraged from waiting on Bryant, knowing it might do them no good. Then again, they might wait even longer and take the chance that the dates will work in their favor.
• Follow the Super Two model and make, say, the 30 percent of the players with the most service time between 5½ and six years free agents.
That way, teams would not know which players were eligible for free agency until much later in their careers. Teams still would try to game the system, just as they do with Super Two candidates, but they would be operating more blindly.
Are any of the above ideas truly workable? Would they result in a host of unintended consequences? I'm not sure. One MLB official actually said it would be easier to modify the Super Two system, as representatives from the players and owners did in 2012.
The two sides agreed to increase the number of two-year players eligible for arbitration from 17 to 22 percent in exchange for the players granting concessions on the amateur draft, but they explored other ideas as well.
The players suggested a grievance procedure that would allow them to challenge roster decisions that they perceived to be for business and not baseball reasons, according to one source. They also talked about enabling players with continuous service from the start of their careers to qualify for Super Two status on a separate track from players who accrued enough service time in bulk.
That's one problem with Super Two — it's not just for the best players. This year's group included not only Josh Donaldson and Garrett Richards, but also Marwin Gonzalez and Louis Coleman — players who, through various promotions over the years, accrued enough service time to qualify.
One ownership representative said that baseball could eliminate the Super Two element entirely by figuring out a lump sum that would cover the entire class of two-year players — those who are eligible for arbitration and those who are not — and dividing the pool equally.
The majority of the two-year players (78 percent) would receive raises — say, to the $800,000 to $1 million range. The best players in the Super Two class would get less, but still could earn big money in their three years of arbitration. The cost to the owners would be the same, and in theory more players would benefit.
I doubt the union would ever endorse a plan that restricted its top earners, but at least the various Super Two conversations offer viable alternatives to the current system.
Now, let's hear the two sides start talking about how to get the best players on the field without concern for when they will become free agents.
I don't have the answer. Smart baseball people don't have an answer. But no other major pro sport in North America conducts its business like this, and in the end the game suffers.
Dammit, I want to see Kris Bryant on Opening Day.
